Home > AQ General > The full version of my article “How al Qaeda works” is now available
The full version of my article “How al Qaeda works” is now available
With thanks to Foreign Affairs for granting me permission to place the article on my website for a limited period.
You can find it at this link.
Categories: AQ General
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© Leah Farrall and All Things Counter Terrorism, 2009-2015. Unauthorized use and/or duplication of this material without express and written permission from this blog’s author and/or owner is strictly prohibited. Excerpts and links may be used, provided that full and clear credit is given to Leah Farrall and All Things Counter Terrorism with appropriate and specific direction to the original content.
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I’m not a scholar of terrorism, just a guy who reads about it on the web. So this isn’t the informed peer feedback you were hoping for. But let me tell you my response. The article seems to me erudite yet blind to something big. I can’t tell you what, but the gap is obvious: “Ramzi Yousef” and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed; who are they, where did they come from, what made them so capable. Just working from the narrative you supply, one would conclude that the escalation to 9/11 was solely a matter of Osama thinking big in order to attract attention and support. But KSM was the operational mastermind, the plot was anticipated by Bojinka, and Ramzi made the first attempt to bring down the WTC. Both in terms of intent and personnel, 9/11 was clearly an outgrowth and expression of whatever force, faction, or tendency KSM and his nephew represent. I know that according to official western analysis, KSM was not part of AQ until the late 1990s; but even if that is so, a history of AQ which tries to explain 9/11 yet doesn’t mention him and his backstory is going to be incoherent. It has to be missing something essential.
Thank you for you analysis and making it available to us. From my understanding it is on the mark, particularly your concluding paragraph. Understanding AQ from their perspective is essential. I have been trying to promote the same line of thinking; however, I also incorporate AQ’s strategic plan (2020 plan) & its phases, as well differences in the concept of victory or success. I hope your article gets some attention from senior leaders and will open opportunities for new analyses to be taken into consideration. The problem is that there is such a gap in depth of knowledge between those who know the subject and decision-makers. I don’t think this was such a problem during the Cold War.