All Things Counter Terrorism

Regular readers of this blog will know that AQAP has been an obsession of mine for years and that  my view of AQAP differs somewhat to conventional wisdom.

In January this year after the undie bomber episode, I had a little rant in which I explained why I find it frustrating that AQAP is viewed as a new and organizationally distinct entity from AQ core and  I stand by this analysis. In fact, since then I’ve found even more things to bolster the case I made there, which I really looking forward to releasing in the thesis, which is creeping ever so much closer to being sent off for examination.

What I wrote in January and what I demonstrate in my thesis is that AQAP is a branch of AQ. It is  not an affiliate, not a franchise, and not a network. Rather it is  an operating branch of AQ, which means that while it may have authority  for attacks in its area of operations (the Arabian Peninsula), it comes under AQ’s strategic command and control for external attacks outside of this area of operation.  And it has always done so, right back to 02.

In other words AQAP cannot launch operations against the US without approval from HQ in the Afghanistan/Pakistan borderlands.  This practice also extends to franchises more generally but it is particularly relevant to AQAP because it is a branch of the organisation rather than a franchise. This means it is held by a tighter set of what you might call operating instructions and requirements.

So, this plot is quite fascinating to me because it gives us the opportunity to look more closely at the nature of how branch and HQ interact and the degree of operational autonomy AQAP has as a branch. In particular, it gives us the opportunity to determine whether blanket approval is provided and then the branch left to its own devices, or whether additional permissions are required when expanding the target sets and tactics used . It also gives us the opportunity to delve into what degree of cooperation occurs, and to what extent is HQ briefed into operations from this branch. So, when I picked up on this snippet of information I was particularly fascinated:

The alert was triggered by intelligence from a unit of GCHQ surveillance experts stationed in Afghanistan, the Sunday Express can reveal. Operating from a converted shipping container in Helmand, the team picked up the words “A wedding gift is being delivered”.

It’s rare to see this type of leak or acknowledgement of the role of what comes across the wires in starting operations, despite this often being the case, and I’m surprised to see that this leak may have originated with the Brits, since they are usually watertight and the unsung heroes of this type of work, particularly in that neck of the woods.

Of course this report could be wrong, but I suspect not, for reasons I’m not inclined to expand upon here. The report is also a little murky, particularly in relation to when and how the Saudis got in the game and via which type of exploitation, which is not surprising for a number of reasons, and which again I’m not inclined to expand upon here.

However, this snippet has me very interested because it suggests there is a greater level of cooperation going on than I had thought between branch and HQ.  It also leads to me ask a number of questions as to whether or not keeping HQ in the loop so to speak is novel to this particular plot or whether it is standard practice.

In the current threat environment and with things reportedly on the boil from HQ in terms of its own external operations believed to be targeted at Europe,  I think it raises a number of important questions and warrants a closer look at external operations planning and coordination, particularly in relation to strategic objectives. On the basis of that I think it is dangerous to view this plot in isolation. I’d also make the same remark in relation to viewing AQAP in isolation  too.

Having said that lumping everything together as one homogeneous whole is also problematic. As is all of the rubbish being spouted about Awlaki in relation to this plot and his status in relation to AQAP more generally (ie the new OBL, ugh what a load of rot)

What that snippet tells me (and with the caveat in place that it could be wrong) is that comms networks between branch and HQ are resilient and also dynamic. The comms channel picked up  appears to have been  new, hence extra assistance was required to contextualise and operationalise the raw intel, which led to the plot being uncovered and disrupted.

This is why historical knowledge is important and why we need to work to fill gaps in our understanding. Clearly there are some contours in the relationship between branch and HQ that we do not fully understand yet, as well as parts of each elements’ operational trajectory.

As I said, this info could be wrong, but even so, on the basis of AQAP’s status as a branch of AQ, I’d argue seeking answers to these questions and further investigation into AQ’s external operations coordination are worthwhile activities, particularly in the current climate.

Very quick…

I do not think this should be dismissed.

The turnaround time for this tape was quick. A fast turnaround time when drone strikes are heightened means there is a strategic purpose for this tape that makes risking a fast turnaround worthwhile.

I’m still pondering whether his warning to France relates to the Euro plot in an operational context ie pre-attack warning and here I return to yesterday’s article about those plots and what Noman Benotman had to say about OBL’s consistency in issuing warnings.  On the basis of past OBL releases , a solid case could be put forward for this proposition.

Alternatively it could just be an attempt to ferment more unease. However, OBL warnings generally have a very specific purpose and coming at this time make me a bit jittery.

Am curious to see if any more messages come to light in the next little while.

A new tape by OBL, apparently. (thanks to @PoliNewsInt for the heads up)

I haven’t downloaded it, but link is here As-Sahab : “Some Points regarding Relief Techniques” By Shaikh Osama Bin Laden H.A – Ansar Al-Mujahideen.

It will  be interesting to see what he has to say about relief techniques, particularly given AQ’s avowed determination to not participate in relief efforts (which we can quite confidently assume is a result of OBL’s direction).  AQ’s unchanged position is

” Our path is a path of fighting Jihad and we do not handle matters of aid or things like it.” (page two of pdf)

or alternatively in another draft of their policy outline

“Our ideology is to fight a holy war and not to be distracted by relief and aid operations or anything similar.” (page 4 of pdf)

Ugh the monumental scale of his hypocrisy never ceases to amaze me.

Update @PoliNewsInt says the message says “stop” or pause with regards to relief efforts. For an account of the tape See http://ojihad.wordpress.com/

–another update from @PoliNewsInt

with regards to the new OBL tape:

Title is “Pause the relief work” (or aid work). The Arabic word “waqfaat” means “stop”, like stopping after reciting one verse of the Quran. So it does not really mean: “Stop and never start again”.

Just as some additional information

Since I’m *technically* not meant to be blogging, or reading things except for revisions of chapters, I was lazy and just hit the “press this” button for the Ansar link, so thanks @PoliNewsInt for the update

Might we finally be seeing the death of that hoary old chestnut thrown about for so long–about a robust pre-9/11 ”AQ” with a large membership base of at least several hundred or more usually several thousand members,  instead of the just under 200 strong membership (198 actually) it had as 9/11 loomed??? As long term readers of this blog will know it is one of the first things I wrote about when I started allthingsct last year.

Peter Bergen’s new piece gives me hope that this may be taking place. Yay!!!

I really hope his piece has some impact in killing off this myth once and for all.

What gives me hope is that this is the first time I can think of  that approximate number has been cited in print with the exception of its original source (which was the 2006 Silverstein article excerpted below which quoted an interview with a former FBI agent)  which I pointed out in this blog a year ago. But I have had my head under the thesis rock recently, so maybe I’ve missed others.

In any case I hope Bergen’s article starts a trend of a broader reconsideration of the figures for no other reason that what I wrote about nearly a year ago…because if we don’t have the baseline correct any effort to define success  is going to be dodgy.  As I noted nearly a year ago

what people miss is that this number of 200 is the same that al Qaeda had BEFORE 9/11. And this comes from a former FBI Agent interviewed by Ken Silverstein (see here).  This is Silverstein’s account:

Two years ago, I interviewed Jack Cloonan, a 25-year veteran of the FBI who, between 1996 and 2002, served on a joint CIA–FBI task force that tracked bin Laden. “How many members of Al Qaeda do you think there are?” he asked me. Cloonan laughed when I pegged its membership at several thousand. The real numbers, he said, “are miniscule.”

Documents discovered by the joint task force, Cloonan said, showed that Al Qaeda had 72 members when it was founded in 1989. Twelve years later, the task force got its hands on an updated membership list after a CIA Predator destroyed a building near Kabul during the American invasion of Afghanistan. The membership list was discovered in the rubble, along with dozens of casualties, including Mohammed Atef, one of bin Laden’s closest aides. It showed that bin Laden had a grand total of precisely 198 sworn loyalists.

I’m reliably informed from another source that this number is  correct and the document authentic.

So then, let’s reconsider….

Are we winning if al Qaeda can keep replicating and stay at the same number of people that it had before 9/11?

On that note Sami Yousafzai and Ron Moreau also have a very interesting piece in Newsweek

Plenty of this is self evident, so I won’t bore you with any additional comments, except to say that one thing stood straight out when I read this. Their account of the class size–some 30 persons. Why this stood out is that this was the size of AQ’s basic training course at al-Farouq (though sometimes they had up to 40). And this size is actually bigger than the advanced training course size at Tarnak, which usually sat at around 15-20 persons.

Previous reports from recent training had tended to suggest AQ was only training at around 15 or so in a group, so this 30 figure stood out immediately. Whether they can still do this is of course a matter for debate, but nonetheless, even with talk of taking out so many fighters, which the authors cover in their article, this account of a full training compliment gives pause for thought.

A quick comment since I’ve just been tidying up some thesis stuff relating to an article I just caught on FP while sneaking a quick coffee break.

It is interesting,  but if you are going to talk Haqqani and his history the first stop for reading absolutely should be Abu Walid al-Masri’s books, and his series profiling Haqqani in the Taliban magazine  (who he has known since the beginning of the first Afghan War, and arguably through whose links the AQ-Haqqani relationship developed).

AQ was not really as affiliated with Haqqani as it was with Sayyaf and then Hekmatyar.

It’s actually why some former mujahideen  have commented on AQ’s lack of combat experience during the first Afghan war viz other groupings. Those who wanted to fight went to join Haqqani, or at least tried to go fight with him. He was not a fan of untrained numpties trying to go to the frontlines. Those who remained with Sayyaf and co did not see as much action.  AQ was in areas first under Sayyaf,  and then Hekmatyar. AQ also declined to assist a training effort Abu Walid and Haqqani along with some others were trying to establish circa 86. Instead OBL went off and established al-Masada, against everyone’s advice. And the two AQ guys who were close to Haqqani, Hafs al Masri and Ubaida al Banshiri (because they fought with him in 84 I think it was), went off to Jaji to “minimise the damage” after a meeting was held in Islamabad about how to deal with OBL’s actions. After the Jaji battles, AQ went to Jihad Wal, which was Hekmatyar’s turf and OBL payed him rent to establish  training camps there, which remained in operation until the US missile strikes in 98.

For those interested in Haqqani’s marriage links (mentioned in the article). He married into a Yemeni family, if memory serves. It’s in the books somewhere.

To me the question is not about the historical links because they were not that strong, but rather what factors have contributed to them being friends with benefits now. And on the basis of this how strong these links are and under what conditions they will endure, and what might cause them to fragment in the future. I am also interested in whether this relationship has strengthened in recent times, why this might be the case, and  the role generational change may have played in this process.  For example Haqqani’s sons and where they fit. They are mixing in a very different milieu than what existed in Afghanistan either under the Taliban or during the first Afghan war and so the potential for ideological bleed over is stronger. The question here though is whose ideology? I could go off on a tangent and talk the IMU and IJU but this is all I have time for tonight.

Also recommended reading is Sirajuddin Haqqani’s town hall meeting this year. His responses, or lack thereof  in some instances, really put the spotlight on a few of these areas. I didn’t  save a copy but it should be floating around out there and for those of you with OSC access I imagine it got translated.

Ok that’s the coffee break over, back to the thesis for me.

Dear US administration

Wheeling out the same figure you used in OCTOBER LAST YEAR to indicate progress against al Qaeda, and then claiming you’ve taken out half the leadership, is not reassuring.

Last year General Jim Jones:

JONES: Well, I think this is one of the central issues and, you know, it could. Obviously, the good news is that Americans should feel at least good about in Afghanistan is that the al Qaeda presence is very diminished. The maximum estimate is less than 100 operating in the country. No bases. No ability to launch attacks on either us or our allies.

http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0910/04/sotu.05.html

And last week: Leon Panetta

Panetta estimated there are fewer than 100 al-Qaida militants operating inside Afghanistan, with the rest hiding along Pakistan’s mountainous western border. He said U.S. drone strikes and other spy operations have helped to ”take down” half of al-Qaida’s senior leaders.

http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2010/06/27/us/politics/AP-US-US-Afghanistan.html?_r=2

++++

Ok my wrist hurts like all hell but I just can’t help myself.

There is NO fricking formal number three position in AQ. OK??????????

And *if* there was, he’s NOT it.

And for what it’s worth I don’t actually think him being taken out will do much.

Why? Well if we’re talking Afghanistan, even though he was the nominal ‘commander’ of AQ in Afghanistan there were more people in my high school class than what AQ has in Afghanistan at any given time.  His death won’t affect AQ in Afghanistan and he wasn’t a skilled military strategist in any case.

And in relation to AQ External Operations, where he *may* have had a more active role, and which is the part of AQ that really poses the most threat to the US, the real business goes on lower down the food chain, and goes into AQ Senior Leadership via a different coms chain.

Regarding media. He was on a tight leash after his screw up last year. And while he was trotted out every now and then for videos and statements, what he said was highly scripted after last year and there’s still others who can make statements. Though it does mean AQ might have to bring out someone else from the shadows.

There will be an  impact in AQ’s finance management, but being the type of person he is, he would have trained someone else. Also AQ doesn’t really finance attacks the way it used to anyway. And people still  go for training using their own money. They go home using their own money. If AQ does dish out money it’s for the attacks and the types of attacks they’ve done means this isn’t a lot of dosh we’re talking about, and even if his death does leave a gap in administration of accounts etc, someone should be able to scrounge that up. Now if we’re talking about larger scale attacks, it could have an impact.

But what has me interested is the mention of who he died with. That’s unusual. I can’t remember who his daughters were married to but I noticed it said they were killed as well as some other men.

I’m betting more than one significant figure got taken out, and this is a means of letting people in the know, know who else got taken out. I could be totally off the mark here, but it struck me immediately that this was a lot of detail for no other obvious purpose.

So what I want to know is who else? That will be a more significant indicator of how much impact the strike had.

Ok wrist hurting. That’s enough for me for a while.

Cheers.

Al-Masri and al-Baghdadi are dead.

I think it speaks volumes  that so many weren’t taking official or unofficial claims from the US or Iraq governments on face value until confirmation by ISI.

There is  a real credibility problem with this type of reporting, caused not least by the proclivity of multiple governments to engage in premature chest beating. This is driven, I guess, in large part by the fact that showing audiences you’re winning is  difficult–not only because of the nature of the conflict but also audience news fatigue.  Of course there’s often a verification problem, but what seems to be more problematic is  the fact many of these governments–including the US– tend to leak information like a bucket with no bottom and before said information has been confirmed, which returns us to the chest beating aspect of it all.

Thus we arrive at situations like this, when not many of us believe information relating to taking out top figures until we hear it from the other side. And so it comes to be that media outfits of terrorist groups are at times operating with more credibility than the  governments they are fighting. Given the history of this problem throughout earlier counter terrorism campaigns it makes one wonder how much has really been learnt.

Anyway,  little rant is over.

I notice the ISI’s  Shariah judge made the announcement, which is how I thought this would play out.   Beyond that I don’t have  much else to add since I covered the implications in my earlier post. That no new leader was mentioned is interesting, but not suprising. They will not want to be attracting excess attention as they try to reconstitute command and control. But I’d wager for now that authority lies with the Shariah judge and council more generally.

And lastly, just my snide little comment about the two leaders being in the same place.  What terrorist group worth their weight in salt has their two main leaders in the same place?  Numpties. That’s extremely poor opsec.   I don’t think  OBL and AZ are in the same place but I’ll bet after seeing this they won’t be meeting up any time soon .

Ok back to the thesis for me.

To be honest despite confirmation I’m still skeptical, especially given how many times these two have been ‘killed’ or ‘captured’.

And especially given reports that al-Masri left Iraq for Afghanistan some time ago– although it is  entirely possible he could have  gone back. Though I also seem to remember reporting he had been killed in Afghanistan too. Ugh

Anyway, if it is them, well it will be very interesting to see what happens.

So, my thesis frazzled off the top of my head thoughts are as follows:

A key question will be with them now gone (especially al-Masri)  how many links still  exist back into AQ core – and at what level in the food chain, so to speak.

If there aren’t that many left –which I suspect is the case, there will be an issue with command and control with AQ HQ.  The composition of AQ in Iraq then becomes an interesting proposition.

This is significant because of the tension between franchise groups of AQ and AQ HQ over their local and regional objectives versus AQ’s more global focus. It’s clear from their communications these issues often come up. And it is tension between objectives, along with ideological issues and ‘staying on message’ both in terms of propaganda releases and attack typologies that seems to dominate the core franchise relationship.

So who is left in AQ in Iraq becomes key.  Having old school members of AQ core in the crew, like al-Masri, was crucial to ensuring the franchise stayed on message. A newer younger generation might have different ideas.

Significant here too are  their ideologues.  Who is the current  sharia judge within the group? What is the status of its sharia committee?  Where will it look for direction? Where will it look if links to AQ core are cut?

We’re not talking about a large group of people here. AQ in Iraq is not the organisation it used to be. However, before people go writing it off they would do well to remember that Zarqawi went to Iraq with 16 people. That was it.

While the cauldron caused by the US invasion of Iraq and ongoing conflict largely drove his ability to rapidly expand and develop his organisation (especially during and after Falluja) and this can’t be repeated now, it would be a mistake to fully write off the organisation.

Another interesting dynamic will be to see how other militant factions/groups linked to the group react and whether they make a move to put the boot in, so to speak.

If these guys have been taken out, this will have a significant short term impact on whoever is left – because of the way AQ in Iraq was/is structured.  All AQ franchises are heirarchical, but the degree of heirarchy tends to be higher in groups operating in conflict zones. AQ under UBL pre 9/11 was an exception here but that’s in part because he is a control freak of epic proportions.

Taking out the two top honchos could leave AQ in Iraq vulnerable to other groups.

I’m interested to see if any AQ media releases  come out in relation to this. They should give some indication as to the group’s next move and what, if any, types of restructure, merger etc may result.

And as I noted in my Jane’s piece, we know that command and control with franchises and with the Iraq AQ franchise in particular  is exercised via the information committees.  So this is where I’d be looking, not just for a  release about this but also for behind the scenes movement in terms of appointing new leaders and subsequent follow up communications with AQ core and any directives that may come from it in relation to this.

Moreover, those in the information committee tend to have the formal, pre-existing links back to  AQ core,  so a leader maybe appointed from within its ranks–at least in the interim. Or hold more sway. But again this depends on the composition of the remaining leadership and also the role of the Sharia judge and his own position viz AQ core and its objectives versus those more localised or regional objectives.

I was just having a quick wander through the forums, which I haven’t done for a little while and noticed that there are quite a few new publications dealing with the issue of prisoners. It’s not something I’ve seen a great deal of focus on lately and particularly not by high profile figures of the ilk who are currently propagating works on the matter.

I haven’t downloaded them, but am just making note of it since at least two of those who have released works recently have the authority to issue a  fatwa in relation to operational matters. Their publications could just be general explanatory works but it’s always worth keeping an eye on what is contained within them in case there is sanction for something specific.