I found this guidance note on the ABC’s website; it’s about differentiating analysis from opinion. Although it’s predominantly for a TV medium, it struck home a little, particularly in the last two points…
Typically, ‘analysis’ —• carries the name of the author• is made by a person with professional expertise orspecialist knowledge aboutthe subject matter being analysed• is grounded in reporting work, usually done by theperson making the analysis• refers to the information on which it is based• is based on information that can be verified• is not purely speculative or based only on faith or belief• is not partisan or ideological• will often discuss options and their pros and cons• refrains from public advocacy• aims to inform and explain more than to rouse or persuade• does not prescribe what should be done nor urge what the audience should conclude.
First, I’ll believe it when al Qaeda acknowledges it.
This of course won’t stop the chest beating celebrating his killing.
And if he has in fact been killed, I wonder if those who think this is a victory (and those supporting the strategy of extrajudicial killings more generally) have given ample thought to the fact that he along with others who have been assassinated were actually a moderating force within a far more virulent current that has taken hold in the milieu. And yes, given his teachings I do note a certain irony in this, but sadly, it’s true.
What is coming next is a generation whose ideological positions are more virulent and who owing to the removal of older figures with clout, are less likely to be amenable to restraining their actions. And contrary to popular belief, actions have been restrained. Attacks have thus far been used strategically rather than indiscriminately. Just take a look at AQ’s history and its documents and this is blatantly clear.
In the years to come, owing to this generation being killed off, this type of restraint will disappear; in fact it is clearly already heading in this direction. A significant part of this change is directly attributable to the counter terrorism strategies being employed today. I’m working on a more detailed, research driven piece on this. But in the meantime, the best way of summing up the consequences of a strategy of killing off leadership instead of using a criminal justice approach lies with what happened in a wildlife sanctuary in South Africa many years ago.
A culling program was implemented to kill off all the older generation elephants owing to overcrowding. Juveniles were spared. However, without the presence of the older elephants they then proceeded to go on rampages, killing other animals and causing such havoc that the rangers thought they’d have to cull them too. Until that is, someone chanced upon the idea of bringing in older elephants from another wildlife park, who ended up bringing the juveniles into line and enforcing discipline, something that had been missing since the cull of the older generation.
Right now you’re probably scoffing at this. Scoff away, because this example has come up time and time again in conversations I’ve had with folks who know this milieu very well because they’ve lived in it. Along with it has been concern expressed for the future, for what will happen when authoritative voices who can restrain the actions of those left and, importantly, those newer folks still seeking to join the cause, no longer exist. When indiscriminate becomes the norm.
So before anyone goes off celebrating another “number” in the death count, it is worthwhile remembering there will be consequences from this short sighted and reactionary path chosen to deal with threat. These consequences will not play out in areas where extrajudicial killings take place, but in indiscriminate attacks in capital cities in the west. I wonder then how those who advocate the current policy plan to deal with this and the implications it will pose for the social contract. But hey, they’re “winning” right????
Hi folks, I have a new article out at The Conversation focusing on what the recent merger between al Qaeda and al Shabab means for Australia.
Comments as always are welcome. Cheers.
Hello folks, well it’s a been a while since I’ve ventured onto the blog. A little bit of burn out coupled with a plate full of other exciting projects means I’ve let it slide. I’ll be getting back into it, but you may find a change of direction coming because I find myself increasingly disenchanted with the current state of play. In particular, I have an issue with the increasingly unaccountable nature of counter terrorism and the militarisation of CT more generally–as well reactions to acts of terror (or fear of them) that belie the values of democratic nations and human rights, not to mention being outright counter productive. And don’t even get me started on disengagement and CVE. But for now, I’m finishing up book research, juggling some other writing, and job hunting, which is keeping me busy. But hopefully that begins to subside soon.
Anyway, for those interested, here are links to two pieces I wrote recently.
One is on al Qaeda’s operational resilience, which I wrote last November, but was only published last month. This article originally appeared in “Al-Qaeda’s Senior Leadership”, a publication of IHS Defense, Security and Risk Consulting, in January 2012. Reproduced with permission © IHS (Global) Limited. All rights reserved.
Happy reading, and feedback is as always, welcome.
For those of you interested, the United States Study Centre has put up all of the audio and video from the summit it hosted last month: The 9/11 Decade. I plan to make some time to listen to some of the speeches I missed but in the meantime wanted to write a few notes about a couple of things that really stood out for me. Had been planning on doing so for a while but real life has intervened. So here it is, better late than never and consisting of my attempts to turn scrawled notes into coherent sentences in a 2am blog post.
One thing that stood out for me (at least in the sessions I saw) was the focus on China, which one could consider quite interesting given the summit was titled the 9/11 decade. But in some respects, it’s not so curious.
For those who remember back to 2000/2001, and particularly for those who were in an International Relations stream at the time, it’s all too easy to recall that before 9/11 came along and re-ordered everything, the next great big threat was China. And boy was it being hyped. It’s forgotten now because of what came along after, but at the time there was lots of talk about the new Cold War, and then we had the Hainan Island spy plane incident in early 2001 and it was all doom and gloom forecasts from some quarters, and from others, arguments that there was not a new cold war but instead we’d all have to contend with a multi-polar system, and a number of regional hegemons, particularly in the Asia Pacific region.
What fascinated me was to hear these things repeated again—almost word for word, a decade later, and after virtual silence on many of these topics (outside of those who specialize in the area). Of course there are a few different things now. Back in 01 the US was strong, and so the discussion was not so much centred on questions like whether the US is in terminal decline, which was an ongoing theme at the summit. So this is a new addition to the discourse and gives rather obvious pause for thought as to how the strategic consequences of the detour into using counter terrorism as an organizational pillar of International Security are going to be viewed by historians over the longer term—particularly in relation to its impact on US power & capabilities across a number of indices. But, I digress.
Anyway, it was interesting because even those at the summit who were optimistic for America’s capacity for replenishment did seem to grudgingly accept that a change towards multipolarity is coming. I was, however, struck by those who thought that China needs containing. Not by the argument itself but rather the lack of evidence behind it—although in fairness this may be more symptomatic of limited time in sessions. What struck me even more though was the firm belief held by some (again with little behind them in terms of supporting evidence) that the United States could actually contain China.
It seems to me that as things currently stand the best anyone can realistically talk about is power balancing, rather than containment, particularly given the geopolitical realities of the region and also of other regions in which the US sees itself as having vital interests.
Speaking of China and containment, I managed to catch the last of Robert Kaplan’s session, where he was talking about blue water naval capabilities and regional dynamics in the Asia-Pacific, particularly in relation to territorial disputes and SLOC’s. I found it interesting, although a little alarmist, but that’s just because I woke up the next morning and literally the very first thing I thought about was China, blue water navy capacity, regional instability, and things going boom. So clearly it stuck in my mind. But I digress.
Another continuity I noticed at the summit was in relation to the complaint/argument that the International Institutions we currently have are (already) insufficient and nowhere near robust and expansive enough to deal with the range and types of situations we will face in the future. Again, this is nothing new. But it was interesting to see this theme emerge, particularly alongside the theme of the US in a potentially terminal decline–as the last lone superpower. This tied in with another theme: the need for a greater focus on international institutions, cooperation and soft power, diplomacy etc etc. Again, none of this is new. But it has been long drowned out by the absolute militarization of counter terrorism and elevation of counter terrorism to an organizing pillar of international security.
It seemed to me that if the summit with its wide variety of speakers and attendees was any indication, then the pendulum may have finally swung back. Maybe, just maybe, we can now move beyond the exceptionalism that has characterized the treatment of terrorism as a security threat. I only hope we do not go from one extreme to another and end up with another new cold War/China threat scenario.
“I don’t understand how somebody could buy the land for $48,000, get the building permits, get a contractor, build for a period of time what is essentially the largest home compound in the area, where somebody lives for five years, and nobody asks who’s there or finds out who’s there,” she said.
I racked up many years in Canberra, and believe me so long as OBL & family snuck in to a house in a darkened car he could have lived undetected there too. In fact, he could probably have wandered around in pseudo disguise without much bother since most Canberrans go out of their way to avoid eye contact or saying hello. Yes, I’m a bit bitter and twisted from my experience there, being from the much friendlier state of Qld, but in all seriousness if no one saw him go in why would they think to ask it, which was pretty much probably the whole reason he was there.
Obviously a lot of questions have to be asked as to how and why he got there, but really.
Records going missing is pretty dodgy though, if true.
Am a bit behind in posting but for those who may not have seen it, FP/NAF’s AfPak channel had a roundtable with a few of us writing down some thoughts on al-Zawahiri’s appointment as amir.
You can find it here http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/06/16/the_zawahiri_era_begins
I also spoke with The Takeaway recently on what the future holds for al Qaeda, which you can find here
There’s more to come in the next little while as I slowly make my way through my list of things to write about either in article form, or here on the blog.