Home > AF-PAK strategy, AQ General, Commentary, Taliban > My new op-ed: “al Qaeda prefers the US to stick around”
My new op-ed: “al Qaeda prefers the US to stick around”
Folks I have an opinion piece out today in The Australian. I wrote it because what has struck me about the ongoing debates about the way forward or way out of Afghanistan is the almost total lack of focus on how al Qaeda sees the conflict, what its strategic intentions are and how it is reacting. This even stretches back to its motivations for attacking the US on 9/11.
Given that al Qaeda continues to be one of the main reasons the US remains in Afghanistan, I think how it sees things is something that should be factored into analysis, especially since it goes right to the heart of the rationale for an ongoing presence on the country.
Comments, as always, are welcome.
via al-Qa’ida prefers U.S. to stick around | The Australian.
Categories: AF-PAK strategy, AQ General, Commentary, Taliban
Excellent piece Leah. I agree AQ wants the US to stay and has every intent to make this happen through terrorist attacks. And while the disruption of recent plots is probably rightly ascribed to the good work of (Western) intelligence services, I might think part of the reason is also AQ hasn’t managed to “up the ante”. The battle is now at another level than a couple of years ago. The way I see it, AQ as a learning organization has failed since it clearly hasn’t been able to reach the level needed for contemporary terrorist organizations. And my guess is one important reason for that is the strain put on the organization through the drone campaign. The number of core members and middle-
managers that have been eliminated is after all impressive.
With regard to the number of Westerners travelling to the FATA, I would doubt all these 100-150 individuals end up in AQ camps. Looking at what is happening in Germany, I’d say it’s the Uzbeks who are receiving most of them. Not saying this is a different trend than before, or this has anything to do with the drone campagne.
Thanks for you great comments, as usual. Will take them on board. Much appreciated. Cheers.
Leah,
I fundamentally disagree and would be happy to provide multiple examples against the supposition that “the strategies the US employs to protect itself from further attacks are likely to inspire more of them and, more importantly sustain al-Qa’ida.”
I understand your point in looking at things from Al Qaeda’s perspective, and I totally agree that it’s important to do – it goes way back to sound fundamentals in understanding warfare and Sun Tzu’s comments on understanding the enemy…
At the same time you are strongly implying if not outright saying that our efforts (generalized for simplicity’s sake here) in Arabic/Islamic countries world are counterproductive.
So first, let me ask a question since I didn’t find the answer to it in your Op-Ed: if we don’t confront the enemy (you call it being goaded) wherever they may be, especially on their ground, how do you suppose we deal with this enemy? If you’re going to go as far as saying everything we’re doing which involves intervention (ranging from CT-lite to nation-building) is wrong then I think you owe an alternative solution. You said “until this is recognized” – so how in practice should it be recognized and then applied? There’s a world of a difference between theory and practice…
Speaking of theory, you said “one of the driving reasons behind Osama bin Laden’s decision to attack the US” was to create “a new, exploitable jihad” and “with the specific aim of inciting it to invade Afghanistan.” So why did Al Qaeda conduct attacks before September 11th both inside and outside the United States such as WTC1, Khobar Towers (possibly arguable if Al Qaeda), USS Cole, African Embassy bombings, etc. with some of these being even before OBL set up base in Afghanistan? And speaking of Al Qaeda strategy, the September 11th attacks were being prepared before anyone had any idea that we would have the President Bush administration in place, much less a strategy of pre-emption or a strategy of confronting the enemy wherever they may be. If anything Al Qaeda and company could probably have expected more of the same from the 1990s. Pinprick responses and lack of commitment to fighting a war being waged upon us. After all, OBL declared war years before we decided to start fighting it. And for that matter, the defense transformation we were so poised to undergo in those years was anything, but meant to address transnational/insurgent threats so it would have been reasonable for Al Qaeda to expect a continued unresposnsiveness.
So could the explanation for recent and future terrorist attacks against our homeland and other countries be as simple as Al Qaeda and affiliates often say it is? A war in “defense” of Islam? You pinned most of your position on the fact that “jihad against an occupying force attracts a level of support and legitimacy that attacking Muslim governments does not. It provides additional justification for al-Qa’ida and those supporting.” Has the Islamist ideology ever lacked the justification or the ability to find a justification for it’s Jihad – not just now, but over centuries? Just look at your favorite Jihadi propoganda tape – there is no shortage of justifications or fabrications for justification and oh by the way, as far as Western intervention, since the Islamist ideology still considers the Crusades as if they happened yesterday you’d have to withdraw pretty far back to counter their justifications based on Western intervention.
Does it make sense then to assume that their propogandizing of “jihad against an occupying force” is a legitimate player in our examination of the cause and effects of both our actions and the enemy’s?
It is well documented shortly after the withdrawal of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan that the jihadists understood those events as indicating not only that God was behind them, but that no power, not even a superpower, could possibly defeat them and that therefore taking any power on (whether it was occupying or not) was not only practical, but necessary and that it was an ideological obligations (still haunting us today).
So yes, just as some top military and counterterrorism experts have said recently, any notion of withdrawal from Afghanistan would not just be a propoganda victory for the Jihadists, but a practical one. And, on that note, I wouldn’t underestimate the power of a propoganda victory. It’s not just a matter of flashy new videotapes. It’s matter of bolstering one side’s willpower and morale at the expense of another. Warfare is not just a matter of guns and ammo, but a test of wills. Even more importantly, I think, not to mention potential losses on our side, how would we ever regain the loyalty and trust of anyone in the Muslim/Arab world who chose to be on our side and then was abandonded (whether you believe for the right or wrong reasons)? How much harder would it be for us the next time if we decided that disengagement was a mistake or even worse, were forced to re-intervene?
Whew that’s a big response Pukk. Thanks! In response to many of your comments and questions I’d like to point out this was not a piece offering advice. It was a piece outlining the viewpoint of al Qaeda. My point was that until al Qaeda’s strategic intentions are better understood we run the risk of playing into their hands hence my comment “until this is recognised”. I wasn’t taking a position on which strategy to employ, rather outlining how al Qaeda sees things and how it manipulates particular situations for its own strategic goals, which are often not as religious as some assume.
Also, FYI Al Qaeda’s first attack was the African Embassy bombings. The rest before it were not. The embassy bombings were also to raise al Qaeda’s profile. The Cole attacks were an attempt to incite an armed response after al Qaeda saw the benefit of US retaliatory action in raising its stature.
I don’t disagree with some of what you say, in terms of the Soviet Union’s withdrawal and its impact, but this doesn’t have to be mutually exclusive to al Qaeda’s wish to recreate this situation for its own advantage. Moreover, al Qaeda’s primary grievance and reason for fighting is not and has never been the US–a fact that is well documented and acknowledged even within its own ranks. Al Qaeda relies on US and western reaction for much of the “political oxygen” (to borrow Kumar Ramakhrisna’s term) it uses to maintain its power and influence and attract recruits.
You raise some interesting points about withdrawing and re-intervention, but as I said my article was not a piece outlining what should or shouldn’t be done. It was the view from the other side.
Just found your blog via a comment at Tom Ricks’ FP blog. Good stuff!
On CT vs. COIN, I heard Kilcullen say at the Washington conference a while back that for CT to work, you needed a big footprint to provide human intelligence and rapid deployment capability. Really as big as COIN would require. My thought is that the insiders don’t see this as a dichotomy at all. Thoughts?
Thanks. You do need a good deal of human intelligence to support CT and boots on the ground as well. Interesting question. Will get around to posting on this once I finish off some urgent work.
Good piece, which I think raises a bunch of very interesting points. The question I have is that while it may be true that some wind might go out of AQ’s sails if NATO leaves Afghanistan, what does this mean for general instability in the region, and particularly in neighboring Pakistan? I had a very interesting discussion with someone in London recently who laid out something very close to what you outline, and his response to this question was that this was an internal Pakistani problem, end of story. But the two are interlinked.
Another thing I would raise is an anecdote I recall from David Rohode’s fascinating series for the New York Times – and that is the increasing radicalization (if it were possible of the Taliban). Might this mean that a victorious Taliban would maybe be more assertively abroad than their predecessors were, and if this were the case, what might the result be if the West left? Or is this just a single anecdote?
Thanks Raff. Been giving that some thought. From the AQ perspective they move on Pakistan. At least that was the view of theri 3IC Mustafa Yazid, but that interview was unsanctioned so it’s not clear whether this is the viewpoint of the two above him. Mind you he also wanted to move on Iran too. Have been wondering how much, if at all things would settle down in Pakistan if there was withdrawal. I think though that some of the Pakistani jihadis are now sufficiently radicalised that they would keep going. Red Mosque comes to mind with this.
Re: the Taliban. It is my understanding he was referring to the Haqqani network. I see this as distinct from Mullah Omar and his inner circle. But it is a good question. This isn’t coming across in Taliban sanctioned official statements though. How much of that is for public consumption viz being legitimate policy statements is a question I guess a lot of people would raise. Regarding the radicalisation on a more general level, I think the issue to a certain extent is whether the top echelons are becoming more radicalised. This brings me back to my point about their statements, which don’t show that. Interesting point though. Thanks. Sorry to be so brief. Furiously busy.
I am very skeptical. Can you offer any actual *evidence* for your headline claim?
Mitchell, skepticism is always a good thing!
Headlines are not written by authors for op-ed pieces. This is done by the paper in question. To answer your question, it has long been known that bin Laden wanted to incite the US to invade. It is in multiple first hand accounts of both al Qaeda members and those around them.
But Leah, you’re not just saying that was the plan back in 2000, you’re saying that’s still the plan now. Is there any evidence for *that*? Do you think Zazi’s objective was to get *more* troops in Afghanistan? Do you think Zawahiri is bluffing when he writes (e.g. in “Exoneration”) that the US is already beaten in Afghanistan and it’s just a matter of time before it goes home?
I’ve seen nothing to suggest it has changed. Zazi was just a foot soldier who was radicalised. It’s not about what he thought, it’s about what the leadership thinks. And yes, it is clear that al Qaeda wants a *protracted* war in Afghanistan. AJ interview Mustafa Yazid July 2009. This is a very interesting interview –especially since he wasn’t meant to go public with this.
In that interview, Yazid said they are there to expel NATO from Afghanistan and reestablish the Taliban state. He also has a bit of jihadi futurism about how America could achieve permanent peace with the future caliphate by accepting Islam or agreeing to pay the jizya. Now he does say that America won’t do the sensible thing and leave quickly, and he blusters that more troops will just increase the zeal of the muj, but that’s all just a way of saying he’s not afraid of a long war. So I’m still not seeing the evidence that AQ leadership specifically intends to prolong the war in Afghanistan through further attacks on the US homeland.
I very much appreciated reading this–a AQ-centric viewpoint seems what is needed and too often not taken. One counterargument (made on the AfPak blog at Foreign Policy by T. Hegghammer:
http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/11/11/the_big_impact_of_small_footprints
) is that downsizing militarily to reliance on drone strikes would be counterproductive, since this might make AQ recruiting easier. But that suggests that maybe the most effective response is to take military approaches to AQ off the table almost completely, and go back to the “police” model, focussing on cutting off funds, monitoring local plots, and keeping would-be terrorists from crossing borders. The lack of attention might reduce AQ’s ability to recruit to a low level, and make them, in the long run, irrelevant: not as emotionally satisfying as exterminating them, but just as effective.
One problem with this, having suggested it, is that the Taliban (if a threat to Pakistan) probably calls for a military response–and it is not clear how to make these two groups distinguishable.
Thank you for your comments. Excellent points. Cheers.