All Things Counter Terrorism

This is a bit of a mixed post, because it’s 5am and I’m sick of fixing my bibliography and it’s too late to go to bed, so I thought what the hell I’ll blog.

Thought I’d do a little round up of the news

First up is Yassin’s fascinating piece about Attiyatallah being killed in Pakistan, and Saif al Adel returning to the field, which you can find here.

A return to the field by al-Adel will have some serious impacts across a range of AQ’s operational activities, but more on that in a later post.

Second up is a piece by Chris on AQ’s media evolution or rather devolution, which you can find here.

This makes for excellent and thought provoking reading especially for me, when my own personal take has been more reductionist and roughly equates to one comment: Adam Gadahn is now in charge of AQ media. He’s got in the innovation levels of a rock.  Surely AQ can do better than him.

Third up is a piece by Aaron, on his thoughts and analysis of Adam’s newest video, which you can find here, and is an excellent read too.

I’ve been stewing these three pieces together because collectively they highlight some strengths and weaknesses in AQ and give a good overview of what may be taking place in its two most important areas of operation: media and external operations, neither of which has exactly gone great for them lately. Having said that, by their metric they’re not doing too badly; causing a several country wide alert, and then the media hype around AQ and their franchise media, which really just gives them more political oxygen, and a few lionised new leaders to boot (hello Awlaki).  Mind you, I can’t see OBL tolerating Awlaki or anyone else rising too far up the foodchain. The million dollar question is whether he can do anything about it, which kind of brings the question full circle  back to what a re-entry by al-Adel provides AQ.

Another thing I’ve been contemplating this morning is the issue of sentence reductions and people being released more generally.

We’ve just seen several guys from the Pendennis trial have their sentences reduced, and a few have already been released. See here

In Canada I think the last of the Osage guys were sentenced for the Toronto 18 plot, getting a similar term to the leader of the Pendennis plot here in Oz. See here.

The thing is that in both instances quite a few of these guys only have a few years jail time left. And as far I know there is no rehabilitation or de-radicalisation programs within the prison system of either country.  And I don’t think that many of them have recanted–at least here.

While we have control orders here, which will help manage those guys when they get out, this is no panacea, and they’re not indefinite. It is a glaring shortcoming and one that is going to become increasingly prominent in a number of countries as people begin to finish their prison sentences.

Yet, there’s been nothing done on developing or instituting a program. Talk about an Achilles heel and one that will be costly too in terms of managing what comes after guys like this get released.

And last, there’s some analysis done by Greg Carlstrom about AQ in Iraq, which you can find here.

This is the money section for me:

Today, Al Qaeda does not exist in Iraq as a single entity. Its mantle has been taken on by a disparate range of groups inspired by its ideology, but lacking the resources and popular support that marked out their predecessor.

In truth, the Wikileaks Iraq war files tell us little that we did not already know about al-Qaeda in Iraq. But they do serve to underline the great irony of the US war in Iraq; that the invasion, billed as part of the so-called “war on terror”, did more to inspire al-Qaeda activity in Iraq than it did to undermine it.

It is an irony that has not been lost on former spymaster Manningham-Buller. “Arguably, we gave Osama bin Laden his Iraqi jihad,” she said earlier this year.

The thousands of incidents detailed in the leaked documents show just how grateful al-Qaeda was

Zarqawi went to Iraq with 16 people; that was it. What grew from them, came solely from our own actions, as Manningham-Buller notes. For anyone advocating the merits of a military response this should be food for thought.  This is not to say it’s not sometimes necessary, but it is time to address the elephant in the room: that occupation not only drives insurgency but it is the life force of AQ. We need to better understand this before we consider any future action in a similar vein.

On that cheery note I guess I had better go back and do some work so that I can get back to this blog full time and the long list of things I still have to finish.

I also remind you (and disclose here for the first time publicly) that in this meeting Abu Muhammad al-Zayyat, the head of your own organisation’s security committee (later appointed head of the military committee in 2000), vehemently objected to your “final” planned operation, the 11th September suicide bombings. Abu Muhammad al-Zayyat believed these missions were illegitimate without Mullah Omar’s permission. The question asked by many, even among the closed group, was: by what right did al-Qaeda by-pass and ignore Mullah Omar? And, of course, even if Mullah Omar had given his permission this would not change the fact that such attacks are completely unjustifiable.

He also notes that OBL asked for access to the LIFG network offshore and was denied.

Link is here http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/images/stories/pdfs/letter-to-bin-laden.pdf

After a nightmarish few weeks I’m playing mad catch ups on the thesis editing merry-go-round and have sadly not read much of anything except my thesis.

I did, however, make time to read  Marc Lynch’s article Veiled Truths, and so should you.

I’ll be offline for a little while longer but am looking forward to returning and catching up on the goings on out there in the world.

Folks, as much as I’d like to keep up with regular and detailed postings, I have some carpal thing in my wrist and a host of other thesis-related aches and pains and on doctor’s orders I need to minimise time spent at desk and typing since chewing this much codeine is not a good. So this means really restricted postings for a while. And if I do post, it will be v. short since I’ll be typing with one hand.

I hope to be back on deck soon, but obviously this has put another delay to finalising the thesis edits.

I can’t figure out how to embed Youtube video. But anyway here is the link

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zxgTdkoM0Bw

It’s ANZAC Day today and in an hour or so people all over Australia will start making their way towards Dawn services across the country where we honour all of those men and women who have given their lives in defence of our country.

I usually try to get home to watch my much adored grandpa (who is a veteran of the WW2 North African and Pacific campaigns) march in the ANZAC Day Ceremony. This year he’s not  marching  due to illness. However, I’m sending him all my love.

And as the clock ticks over this morning for the Dawn service, I’ll be saying a prayer of thanks to those who made the ultimate sacrifice  and reciting these words from Binyon’s poem For the Fallen, which are recited in services across the country:

They shall grow not old, as we that are left grow old;
Age shall not weary them, nor the years condemn.
At the going down of the sun and in the morning
We will remember them.

Lest we forget.

Folks, I’m mired down in thesis, but in between edits and re-writes I managed to do a little interview with BBC Radio on militant use of the internet. It aired on BBC Radio last Friday, I think. I’ll chase up the links to that this week, but what I will be posting once I get permission from Abu Walid is some questions he answered for me as part of that interview. His responses, which I discussed in the interview are, I think, quite interesting.  So stay tuned later in the week and once I have his permission I’ll post his response.

I’m *still* also waiting for Jane’s to give me a pdf copy of the piece I wrote on Al Qaeda’s Senior Leadership and Command and Control and will chase that up again too.

Thank you for your ongoing readership and patience while I get the pesky thesis out of the road. It has to be in and signed off and off and away to examiners by July, so until then things will be as they have been lately–a little on the quiet side. I’ll keep posting news and things I come across on my daily reads as well as a few of the things I promised to post  ( ie the rest of the translations) but that’s about it.

Once thesis is  done I have some seriously big plans to go into blog overdrive. For starters I’m not sure I’ll know what to do with all my spare time until I figure out what to do next and get myself another full time job!

Although one of my plans, post thesis submission, while I work out career next is to go on a little *get fit like the muj* program. Yup. That’s right.  She who has been a desk jockey for far too long while doing thesis and who has of late only run towards sale signs is going to take that pesky training camp fitness program floating around the net and see if it works.  As suggested by a friend I’ll post updates on that. Should give you all something to giggle at if nothing else. I’d like to think I could cheat and get fit before July comes and I start the program. But at the rate I’m going (and the dust currently gathered on my cross trainer) clearly that is  not going happen.

Anyway stayed tuned for the Abu Walid response; for those of you interested in the impact the internet has had on militant ideologies  I think you will find it especially interesting.

Cheers.

While taking a rather long nap today it seems I missed some important news. The Indonesian President confirmed Dulmatin was killed on Tuesday in Indonesia.

These are my first pre-caffeine thoughts on the news and I’ll try to post something more considered when I am awake and have read some more.

But first, let me offer  a huge congratulations to the INP for some stellar work. Though I feel for them over the next few weeks since Umar Patek is reportedly still on the loose and I’d wage a fairly good bet is also in or around the area–if reports he too relocated from the Philippines are true.

That Dulmatin was operating in the broader environs of Jakarta, is significant, particularly with Obama’s visit later this month.  For those who are not aware of his background, there was a USD 10 million dollar bounty on his head. Dulmatin was an explosives expert who was involved in the 2002 Bali bombings. He was operating in the Philippines for years.

This is speculation on my part, but from what  is in the media it seems Dulmatin  arrived back in Indonesia after Noordin Top was killed and was busy building up a capacity in the country again. It seems Umar Patek, who was in the Philippines with Dulmatin also traveled over. Together they are as potent a mix as Azahari and Noordin Top were. In fact, given their experience in the Philippines, probably more so. Their arrival may not be related to Top being taken out, but from I’ve read the timing is somewhat suspect.

Patek has not been taken out yet, so I presume there will be a flurry of activity going on to ensure that whatever remains of cells  can be neutralised.  Patek was a field commander for the Bali bombings too, so if he is in-country and particularly still floating around the capital, any cells Dulmatin had established will  have a regenerative capacity and can still be operationalised. Patek is also an IED expert as well as being very adept at recruitment. So this will be the main concern over the next little while.

I’m imagining attention will be now focused on whether Dulmatin and co. were trying to target Obama or launch a campaign to coincide with his visit. In terms of whether or not they were operationalising to  target Obama, I’d guess they were, but I’d also suspect that they were planning for a campaign in Jakarta before this news of a visit came to light, and so probably just changed their plans.

They may have even concluded it  was too difficult to target Obama and  just readied devices to deploy while he is in the country, which would also have a significant impact. Given Dulmatin’s pedigree and the fact he had apparently been based near the capital for some time, it’s a fairly safe bet to say he wasn’t planning  a shopping visit. He was there for operational activity of the type that goes boom. There are some reports that at least three detonators were found in the raids.

Here my thoughts turn to what the INP will probably be doing now – which is trying to determine whether a VBIED(s) or other devices had already been made and are still out there in a bomb making  safehouse and then locate them asap.

The modus operandi of these guys is such that these devices do get made relatively early on in the process — if they feel they have adequate safety and resources.

If you recall when Noordin was taken out there was a VBIED ready which was to be targeted at the Indonesian President’s motorcade. I’m not sure if a date had even been set for that attack, but the device was set to go (or pretty close to it, if memory serves).

In other words VBIED’s or other devices may have already been made. Dulmatin got taken out at an internet cafe, which tends to suggest he was well established, which also gels with reports that he had been operating in and around the environs of Jakarta for some time.

This means there will be more than one safe house to locate and presumably more than one cell to uncover. With Patek reportedly still floating around, this is troubling. I’m curious to read reports that Dulmatin got taken out at point blank range, rather than taken in.  More on that later… I need coffee badly.

The statement is in Bahasa although there is also an English translation at the link. It’s about recent events in Aceh.

The video looks interesting. A pic is below. The password to download it is: 4lqoidah1ndonesia

I’ll add this to the long list of things I still need to look at and try to post later. But I have totally dropped my bundle as we say here and am so far behind.

I haven’t had a chance to fully read it yet, but the first few lines have me very interested. The article is called The Kidnapping of Mullah Baradar: a successful intelligence operation turns into a strategic failure

To start the article Abu Walid provides a summary of important decisions made by the Shura Council Baradar headed. The three decisions he identifies, I think,  portend to some  potential blowback that could ensue following Baradar’s removal.

The decisions are:

1. to disengage the Taliban from al Qaeda

2. to prevent jihad work from deviating into sectarian strife/issues, as occurred in Iraq

3. to prevent al Qaeda from transferring the mistakes made in Iraq into Afghanistan.

As I said I haven’t had a good read of the article yet, which I hope to do later this weekend, but the other thing that struck me in the quick skim I had, was that Abu Walid points to the “profound effects on the political level” Baradar’s capture will have, but believes that it won’t impact upon Taliban military activities.

This stood out for me because these political effects as he also notes will include the rise of a new younger generation of leaders with new revolutionary ideas in military and politics.

Reading this comment returned me to the three decisions of the Shura Council, and whether these would stand with a new younger leadership.

This is a point that has been raised by a number of well informed analysts and commentators who have highlighted the possibility that removing Baradar may in fact reduce the likelihood of negotiations eventuating.

Anyway, there’s more in the article, but I am meant to be on a reading ban so have been rather naughty by indulging myself with a quick read. I’ll try to add some more commentary later.

Oh, and as a final aside, Abu Walid has also answered questions from a reader about the assassination of Azzam and the possibility that Jordanian Intelligence could have been involved.  He says it is possible but the matter wasn’t really investigated back then. From my own perspective I’d add that mujahideen documents I have read over the years have often referred to the fact that it was common knowledge that the Office of Services (MAK) was infiltrated by Jordanian Intelligence. Whether that infiltration was before or after Azzam was killed I don’t know and to what extent I also don’t know. But in the context of the questions posed to Abu Walid, I thought I’d just add my two cents worth.

Ok back to pesky thesis. Cheers.